Understanding the psychological aspects of the radicalisation process: a socio-cognitive approach by Garcet, Serge
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tfsr20
Forensic Sciences Research
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tfsr20
Understanding the psychological aspects of the
radicalisation process: a sociocognitive approach
Serge Garcet
To cite this article: Serge Garcet (2021): Understanding the psychological aspects of
the radicalisation process: a sociocognitive approach, Forensic Sciences Research, DOI:
10.1080/20961790.2020.1869883
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/20961790.2020.1869883
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis Group on behalf of the Academy of
Forensic Science.
Published online: 17 Mar 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 73
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Understanding the psychological aspects of the radicalisation process:
a sociocognitive approach
Serge Garcet
Interpersonal Criminology and Victimology, Department of Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Liege, Liege, Belgium
ABSTRACT
Understanding the psychological dimensions underlying the radicalisation process is a con-
siderable challenge in the context of the legal judicial treatment of perpetrators of acts of
radical violence. This clinical and qualitative study is based on an analysis of legal expert
interviews of people at different stages of the radicalisation process. It highlights common
psychological characteristics in personality, mechanisms of moral neutralisation and socio-
cognitive and interpretive treatment during radicalisation. These observations suggest the
applicability of a model of cognitive–emotional transformation of self and meaning-building
in radical violent engagement.
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Research on violent radicalisation has developed
from separate fields that have inevitably emphasised
different radicalisation factors and highlighted dif-
ferent topics. A systematic scoping review of 148
studies between 2001 and 2015 on the transforma-
tion of radicalisation into violent extremism [1]
identified three main factors in the scientific litera-
ture on radicalisation: push, pull and personal factors.
Push factors refer to structural roots that lead to ter-
rorism, such as loss of legitimacy, geopolitical factors,
state repression, relative deprivation, inequality, inter-
group contact, injustice and violence. Pull factors,
which are considered the main radicalisation factors,
are aspects that appeal to extreme groups and life-
styles, such as group belonging, group mechanisms
and incentives. The authors of the review add to this
category what they call “cognitive factors”, such as
consumption of propaganda, cultural congruence,
perceived efficacy, group morality and adventure
seeking. Personal factors include individual psycho-
logical characteristics that make the person more
vulnerable (mental health conditions, depression,
trauma), personality traits and individual demo-
graphic characteristics. If this three-factor structure
corresponds fairly well to the segmentation of aca-
demic research fields, it corresponds very poorly to
the ways in which a person constructs their relation-
ship to the world. Therefore, a new integrative per-
spective, based on sociocognitive understanding, is
needed to describe the interactions between these dif-
ferent factors. Indeed, the dominant approach in radi-
calisation research has long reduced personal factors
to a possible psychopathological or sociodemographic
fragility and defined the individual as a constitutive
element of a social structure, who is passively influ-
enced by push and pull factors. Most importantly, the
dominant approach fails to take into account the role
of the interpretive system. This system is based on
the abstraction and symbolisation capacities generated
by mental representations of the self and the world;
these permit various cognitive operations of selection,
categorisation and attribution and allow an individual
to direct his/her actions toward personal goals that
he/she values.
It has been established that psychopathological
and psychiatric approaches specific to personal fac-
tors, as described above, have failed to identify a
profile connected to mental illness or psychopatho-
logical structures [2–8]. Nor have psychoanalytical
approaches [9, 10] demonstrated heuristic value. As
Taylor and Quayle [11] point out: “the active terro-
rist is not discernibly different in psychological terms
from the non-terrorist; in psychological terms, there
are no special qualities that characterize the
terrorist”. The same is true of radicalised people.
This difficulty in identifying, at the psychological
level, the origin of the radical process that leads to
violent acts ultimately led to an epistemological
break; the question of “why” in relation to the act
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having been set aside for “how”, consistent with an
interactional and processual rationale [12].
The sociocognitive framework of personality has
been broadly validated. The use of this framework
permits a return to the psychological aspects of radi-
calisation through mental operations (processes)
and sociocognitive content (e.g. representations,
schemas, distortions) that constitute the person’s
interpretive system [13]. Indeed, “individual radicali-
zation takes place during the changing phase in
which a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisi-
tion and identity reassessment occurs. Changes in
behaviour (including violent behaviour) is one product
of the outcome phase and is a reflection of the solidi-
fication and empowerment of the individual’s new
meaning perspective, belief system, and identity”
[14]. Taking a sociocognitive approach to radicalisa-
tion involves questioning the effect of the person’s
information processing on his/her own cognitions
and environment during the radicalisation process.
In his article Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set
[15], Borum states that “All people operate on their
own internal ‘map’ of reality, not reality itself. This is
a mental-behavioral phenomenon that psychologists
refer to as ‘social cognition’. If people understand their
opponents’ ‘maps’, it becomes easier to understand
and to anticipate their action.” Each individual has a
capacity for self-determination that allows them to
intentionally influence their environment by adapting
their behaviour, emotions, goals and values to the
situations encountered [16]. This is achieved by
arranging the environmental conditions so that
they are most conducive to producing the indicated
behaviour and by creating cognitive aids and self-
reinforcing aids to support this behaviour [17].
This capacity is developed through the person’s
idiosyncratic interpretive system. The resulting
action defines the individual’s behavioural signa-
ture and personality [18].
This subjective interpretive system also forms the
basis of self-reflection, which allows individuals to
anticipate their actions and assess the personal
impact of their experiences and their effect on the
situations in which they directly or indirectly
participate. These capacities for self-organisation,
self-reflection and self-regulation that underpin self-
efficacy beliefs are at the heart of the capacity for
self-determination that Bandura called human
agency [19]. Of course, agency is exercised within
the limits and constraints imposed by the reciprocal
interactions between individual, behavioural and
environmental factors. This reading of social cogni-
tion therefore goes further than the identification of
vulnerability or risk factors (as in the push–pull fac-
tors model), as it postulates that there is a dynamic
and permanent interaction between internal and
external factors. These factors influence and change
reciprocally in a contingent, interdependent and varia-
ble manner, over time and in different situations.
The cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS)
proposed by Mischel and Shoda [20, 21] represents
this interpretive system as a set of five types of
cognitive-affective interconnected units. These units
constitute mental representations (in the sense
mentioned above) and schemas; that is, organising
principles that explain lived experiences and guaran-
tee a stable perception of oneself and the world.
Cognitive-affective units are made up of (1) catego-
risations and definitions of oneself, of others and of
the world. These are based on personal experience
and aspects of the environment (e.g. family, culture,
peers, society). These different “data banks” are
organised according to different implicit theories of
personality, stereotypes or prototypical readings.
These categories are subject to various interpretive,
inference and attribution biases, including hostile
world schemas and attribution of hostility toward
the exogenous group [22, 23]. They are also struc-
tured according to the positive or negative valence
of the (2) emotions associated with them. The
CAPS also produces (3) expectations and beliefs
about social relationships and a personal sense of
self-efficacy. The principles that govern moral judg-
ment are part of these mental representations. Goals
and values (4) are developed around projections of
oneself in the future, goals or life projects associated
with expected and desired positive consequences,
but also with negative consequences and the fears
that accompany these representations and affect
the feeling of self-efficacy. Finally, there are (5) cog-
nitive processes of self-organisation, self-reflection
and self-regulation. In this sense, the cognitive
mechanisms of moral neutralisation [24–26], which
allow the person to avoid cognitive dissonance
between performed acts and representations or
beliefs by modifying the self-perception of individual
responsibility, can be seen as stemming from the
action of these different sociocognitive units.
Bandura [27–29] identifies eight mechanisms of
moral neutralisation; these are divided into three
groups that focus on the perception of the transgres-
sive behaviour, on the link between an action and
its effect and finally on the person who became the
object of the transgressive act.
Like any other type of behaviour, radicalisation
can be considered a process in which the reciprocal
determinism that guides the relationships between
the person, their behaviour and their environment
permanently modifies the person’s whole interpre-
tive system (the CAPS). Radicalisation is therefore
identified by a progressive and continuous trans-
formation of representations, goals, beliefs and
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sources of reinforcement. Using this sociocognitive
approach, it is therefore possible to go beyond the
mechanistic model of radicalisation, which com-
prises a juxtaposition of push, pull and personal fac-
tors, and to propose a model that integrates push
and pull factors within the person’s interpretive sys-




The difficulty of accessing the relevant study popu-
lation limits research on radicalisation. Another
inherent problem with this type of research is select-
ing inclusion criteria appropriate to the radicalisa-
tion process, which can be defined as “a process
through which people become increasingly motivated
to use violent means against members of an out-
group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioural
change and political goals” [30]. Although it may be
easy to identify people who have in one way or
another participated in terrorist-like activities or
have been identified by the legal and penitentiary
systems as radicalised, it is more difficult to recog-
nise where the radicalisation process begins and
from what moment a person should be considered
part of this process. However, in this study, we
assumed that there is no gap between a common-
place thought and a radical thought, and that radica-
lisation is a continuum characterised by a progressive
exacerbation of representations and values (cognitive
radicalisation), which can be associated with differ-
ent types of behaviour (behavioural radicalisation).
Therefore, we thought it is important to analyse
the development of the cognitive processes that
underlie the radicalisation process as soon as they
appear in thought or discourse. These cognitive
processes may indicate an intellectual attraction to
the themes advocated by the radical cause as soon
as an orientation to the cause appears. We included
subjects who only expressed cognitive adherence
to the arguments of the Islamic State, which is
consistent with the literature on radicalisation
processes. Indeed, to explain the radicalisation
process, Borum [31, 32] and Moghaddam [33] refer
to such subjects in terms of their relative depriva-
tion, and explain the first stage of the radicalisation
process by a critical positioning of the subject
within his/her environment. Wiktorowicz [34] sug-
gests that a prior cognitive openness of the person
is needed in addition to several other key compo-
nents of mobilisation; namely, the socialisation pro-
cess, non-coercive radical discourse and a search for
meaning through religion. This cognitive openness
may be triggered by a personal crisis or may be
associated with previous social experiences of dis-
crimination or victimisation. In the same way,
McCauley and Moskalenko [35] consider a first radi-
calisation level that comprises sympathisers who
adhere to the radical cause without endorsing vio-
lence. The integrative model of Ponsaer et al. [36]
and the “sensitivity” phase in the model of Doosje
et al. [30] feature the same integration of subjects
at the threshold of the radicalisation process. We
therefore included in the study individuals who
adhered to a radical cause and exemplified cognitive
radicalisation but not the subsequent expression of
behavioural extremism.
This research used a qualitative and inductive
clinical approach to study 27 people characterised
by their personal level of involvement in the radicali-
sation process. The study used pre-trial judicial psy-
chiatric and psychological reports and is ongoing. All
the study subjects were Belgian but of Maghreb ori-
gin and aged from 17 to 31 years (mean: 24.6 years).
All subjects defined themselves as Muslims but were
unable to clearly state which religious current they
followed; for instance, all but four could not say pre-
cisely if they were Salafist or not. The religious know-
ledge of most of the subjects was very poor and
stereotyped. They all referred to the “Islamic State”
as a single entity, without identifying with any spe-
cific faction or group commitment. The subjects had
participated in military operations (returnees) or in
acts labelled as terrorist (five subjects). Some subjects
had been screened by the prison administration and
incarcerated for reasons linked to radical issues (nine
subjects). Six subjects had been identified while in
custody as having radical attitudes, although they had
not been prosecuted for infringements linked to rad-
icalism/terrorism. Finally, the sample included seven
subjects who had not been identified as radicalised
by the legal and prison systems but whose affirm-
ation of religious identity and statements indicated
their support of the radical Islamic cause when inter-
viewed by an expert. The sample therefore provided
a collection of testimonials from individuals at differ-
ent stages of the radicalisation process, prior to the
full involvement of the legal and prison systems. Our
objective was to propose a model of the cognitive
processes underlying the different approaches cited
above, so it was important to obtain a sample rele-
vant to those approaches. Finally, from a medical–
forensic perspective, it is important to recognise that
sensitivity to radical ideas is a vector of radicalisation
in imprisoned people. We felt that it was scientifically
relevant to take into account this intellectual proxim-
ity to better understand the cognitive processes that
gradually neutralise moral inhibitions and reinforce
radicalisation even in the first stage.
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Methods
All the expert interviews were conducted according
to a similar protocol that included a clinical compo-
nent and psychometric and projective tests. The
same person interviewed subjects and administered
the psychological assessment in prisons in the south
of Belgium (18 subjects) and in a private profes-
sional office (9 subjects). Subjects were interviewed
in the context of a unique conference lasting for an
average of 2 h. The interviews were not recorded,
but written notes were taken.
The clinical approach we used comprised an
anamnestic examination in the form of a study of
the life course. It addressed family, educational, pro-
fessional, relational and emotional spheres. The
information in the person’s file was also mentioned
regardless of whether these related to the issue of
radicalisation. The approach also comprised an
examination of the person’s medical and psycho-
logical history. In addition to this anamnestic exami-
nation, the interview included a discussion on
radicalisation to situate the subject’s personal trajec-
tory and representations at the time of the inter-
view. The mechanisms of moral disengagement used
by the subject in relation to radicalisation were
also analysed.
The psychometric approach comprised the admini-
stration of several scales and inventories including
the matrices of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS)-III for adults [37]; the Mini International
Neuropsychiatric Interview [38]; the Symptom
Checklist 90 (SCL-R90) [39]; the International
Personality Disorder Examination for the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th
Edition (DSM-V) [40], and the 10th revision of the
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) [41];
the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-L2/SQ2)
[42]; Rorschach’s psychodiagnostic projective tests
[43] and Murray’s Thematic Apperception Test [44].
Other scales were administered according to the
requirements of the expert interviewers.
Two types of information were therefore col-
lected. The first type is descriptive: it corresponds to
the results of the various tests and inventories and
describes the population encountered. The second
type of information, the subject of this article, is
based on an analysis of the subjects’ radical dis-
course and the description that they provided of
their life path.
Results
Characteristics of the interviewed subjects
Subjects were young men ranging in age from the
end of adolescence to approximately 30 years.
During their adolescence, 20 subjects had frequently
or infrequently presented with behaviour disorders
as defined by the DSM-V/ICD-10 [40, 41], the
intensity of which ranged from mild to severe, with
limited prosocial emotions. Personality disorders
were observed in 23 subjects, similar to the general
prison population. The other subjects regularly pre-
sented features of specific personality types but did
not demonstrate a long-term pervasive personality
disorder. In terms of DSM-V/ICD-10 classification,
the personality types most frequently observed were
narcissistic (16 subjects), antisocial/dissocial (19 sub-
jects), and borderline/emotionally labile, impulsive
and borderline (11 subjects). Only three subjects
had psychiatric disorders in the form of schizoid
personality, schizophrenia and delusional disorders.
Most subjects had double diagnoses of personality
disorders. According to Young’s classification [42],
schemas that refer to preferential patterns of infor-
mation processing, the strictness that conditions
dysfunction, are most often characterised by
“impaired limits”; that is, these individuals have not
developed adequate internal limits in regard to reci-
procity or self-discipline. Such individuals have an
egocentric and weakly empathetic character and dif-
ficulty implementing frustration management.
We also used Bandura’s model of cognitive
mechanisms of justification and moral neutralisa-
tion. According to Bandura, moral disengagement is
translated into various mechanisms that are classi-
fied into three groups depending on whether they
deal with the perception of aggressive behaviour, the
link between the act and its effect or the effect on
the person or group that is the subject of the trans-
gressive act. The mechanisms observed related
mostly to perceptions of violent behaviour and the
victims of the act. “Moral justification” by reference
to a social need (defence of the Muslim community)
and values (in the form of a reference to God and
His Law) makes any actions taken socially accepta-
ble and personally valued. The “advantageous
comparison” mitigates the behaviour by comparing
it to supposed immoral attitudes of the Western
toward Muslims. Regarding the third group, which
relates to perception of the victims, mechanisms of
dehumanisation were observed. They included
divesting the victims of human qualities so that they
are seen as objects. “Attribution of blame” or criti-
cism of the victim was also often used. This mecha-
nism allows individuals to divest themselves of
responsibility by defining themselves personally or
through the group as belonging to a group of
true victim(s) of the act committed. Finally,
“euphemistic labelling”, which consists of sanitising
the rhetoric, was also often expressed in statements
of the persons interviewed.
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Speech analysis
Data analysis was carried out according to the prin-
ciples of grounded theory. After coding the data
from each subject, data were categorised according
to the following criteria: victim positioning, the
presence and recurrence of moral disengagement
processes, positioning in relation to violence and its
legitimacy, positioning in relation to the environ-
ment and what gradually constitutes the exogenous
group, the affirmation and expression of radical
representations and violent behaviour and the
empowerment of discourse in relation to societal
values. These criteria were then linked to integrate
the data into clusters. The analysis revealed different
key moments during the radicalisation process. We
grouped the observations into five stages according
to the evolution of the psychological processes used
in the subjects’ conduct and their interaction with
their environment. These clusters or stages formed
the basis of our model of the radicalisation process
(Table 1).
Subsequently, we reconciled these descriptions of
the psychological functioning of the persons
involved in the radicalisation process with existing
models, and defined three phases: fascination, radica-
lisation and terrorist involvement (Figure 1).
The fascination phase comprises the first two
radicalisation stages, which translate the dynamic of
reconciliation through the subjective analysis of the
specific attributes of the radical cause and the posi-
tive valence that the person gives it according to
his/her own history. At this stage, the person usually
adopts the position of a victim, characterised by a
negative individualism fed by the biased representa-
tions of persecution, misunderstanding, injustice
and demands.
The radicalisation phase also comprises two parts.
In the first, the person evolves toward identity
adherence, which is characterised by proactively tak-
ing steps to look for peers while distancing him/her-
self from traditional referents (e.g. family, school,
other associations). The person also adopts an
increasingly polarised view of the world. The emer-
gence of activism follows the process of engagement
and identity affirmation. Activism can be described
as peri-democratic to the extent that it is situated
on the fringes of social and democratic norms. This
level of identity adherence is principally the sound-
ing board that constitutes a group of peers at this
stage of the radicalisation process. The person is no
longer only reinforced by their own representations
in relation to themselves, or by the effect they
believe they have on their environment, but also by
the positive feedback they receive from external
observers, whose adherence to the cause emphasises
and reinforces the choices made. This collective
pressure from the radical group, represented in
Figure 1 by an inverted triangle that describes
the increasing influence, rests on a dialectic, non-
coercive process in which social modelling and
stronger interactions progressively align the inter-
pretive context proposed by the group and the inter-
pretive system of the person. At this stage of
identity adherence, the subject moves beyond the
phase of fascination, in which the radical topic
remained external, even if the subject tended to
bring it closer to merge with it and assimilate it into
his/her definition of identity.
The engagement phase is defined at the sociocog-
nitive level by a loss of inhibitory mechanisms and
a difficulty in backtracking. This is because ques-
tioning the choices made would create cognitive dis-
sonance that is difficult for an individual to manage,
given the lack of differentiation between personal
and collective goals.
Discussion
Our modelling of the cognitive and affective self-
definition and meaning construction in violent
radical engagement addresses the phenomenon of
radicalisation from a psychological perspective and
clarifies the cognitive processes underlying the
motives of young individuals who have left their
country to join wars to further the Islamic State or
to commit terrorist attacks. At present, even if the
Califate were defeated, numerous terrorist attacks
would still be committed. However, the operating
mode of such attacks has changed. The dissipation
of ISIS has deprived terrorist attacks planned in
Western countries of the logistics necessary to rea-
lise large-scale violent acts. As a result, the recent
terrorist attacks seem mostly expressions of radica-
lised individuals who are less involved in complex
networks of recruitment. The instability and fragility
of the personality structures that seem to characte-
rise recent profiles of perpetrators of terrorist acts,
together with an apparent lack (or minimum) of
links with structured networks, indicate that the col-
lective pressure of radical groups, which was notice-
able during earlier radicalisation and engagement
phases, is now weaker. To understand these changes
and the reasons individual commit such attacks, it is
necessary to examine the frustration mechanisms
related to the fascination phase (i.e. the initial phase
of the radicalisation process).
The fascination phase reflects a passage from a
“simple” feeling of a shared radical Islamic cause to
a proactive step toward it. The main radicalisation
models assume that this step begins with a personal
(affective component) and collective frustration,
which results from a subjective comparison of
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perceived disparities and inequalities (cognitive
component) [45].
This comparison process generates a self-perception
“in the negative” [46], which tends to change into a
victim attitude based on the person’s perceived lack of
something that “he/she has not” or “he/she is not”.
This differentiation is associated with a negative
charge. The negative identity associated with this vic-
tim attitude is nevertheless a source of positive
reinforcement and gratification, as it contributes to a
social identity and feeling of belonging to a certain
group, even if that group is perceived as discriminated
against. This attitude legitimises the radical statements
of the group with which the person tries to create
proximity, which is mostly imagined at this stage. In
fact, external reasons for persecution, incomprehension
and injustice (which combine to generate a perception
of discrimination on behalf of the exogenous group)
prevent the person experiencing cognitive discrepancy.
The justification of existential suffering caused by such
external factors transforms the feeling of frustration
resulting from negative comparisons, feelings and
emotions (e.g. anger or frustration) into an expression
of a right and legitimate revolt, sometimes even
redemption. The accumulation of positive attributions
related to the evaluative component stimulates the
cognitive component of identity adherence through
the person’s recognition of his/her adherence to the
cause. At this stage, the affective component is often
composed of individual considerations and emotional
aspirations that also reinforce the identification.
Even more than the radicalisation and engagement
phases, this first phase of fascination for the radical
cause establishes a breach that expresses a radical
interpretation through reformulation of the moral
basis induced by the transformation of the victim
attitude. In fact, this attitude legitimises the claim
and the use of non-democratic and violent means,
even if at this stage the violence is perpetrated by
others and the person adhering to the cause is still a
spectator. The reformulation of the moral basis that
Table 1. Interactions among the environment, behaviours and cognitive processes observed during the stages of fascination,
cause orientation, identity adherence, identity activism, and terrorist involvement.
Stages Interactions among the environment, behaviour and cognitive processes
Fascination  Subjective analysis of specific attributes of the radical cause depending on experience, culture, personal life events.
 Positive value attribution, to the radical statements perceived as exterior. The attribution is based mostly on individual
considerations such as an attachment to a relative, to a peer group, the desire to be recognized, the need of excitement
and adventures.
 Justification of existential attitude by means of external attributions (injustice in the world) which allowed (1) to avoid
cognitive discrepancy and discomfort resulting from a gap between aspirations and capacities to realize them (2) to
transform advantageously the sense and to use negative emotions and feelings (anger, frustration) to express a right
and legitimate revolt.
 Reformulation of moral basis in order to trivialize the use of group violence which arouses fascination.
 Elaboration of positive self-reinforcing representations that support the adequacy between the legitimacy of radical
discourse and a violent action.
Cause orientation  Active steps in quest for information. The proximity with the desired cause induced by cognitive restructuration serves
as a motive and as a reinforcement to continuation and amplifies the behaviour that arises from it.
 Appearance of signs related to identity. They define first of all at this stage a claim of adherence in the context of
social environment. Later they tend to disappear taking into account their contradictions in relation to activism goals.
 Orientation of behaviour and establishment of environmental conditions necessary to get closer to positively marked
radical topics and to assimilate them (self-conferring of status, familiarity with discourse contents, … ).
 Repetition of behaviour. The person behaves in the same way because he/she thinks that his/her actions will lead to
the same results and consequences. The positive value of reinforcements which are obtained as a result of his/her
actions condition the probability of the repetition of this behaviour.
Identity adherence  Continuation of cognitive restructuration which started at previous stages, namely as an increasing polarization.
 Distancing from traditional referents, from the family, from the community of origin, which are perceived as external.
 Sounding board of peer group. The person is not only reinforced by his/her own representations of himself or by the
impact that he/she thinks to have on the environment, but also by the positive opinion of exterior observers whose
adherence to the cause amplifies the value of reinforcement.
 Internalization of discourse. Exceeding the attitude of the fascination phase in which radical topics remained exterior to
the person in order to assimilate radical topics and gradually merge with the identity references towards the logic of
collective frame- working.
 Reinforcement of cognitive mechanisms of moral neutralization by the group.
Identity activism  Identity related activism which is increasingly outrunning social and democratic norms (peri-democratic activism)
low and middle intensity actions, provocations, threats, support of radical actions of the group (concealment, spotting)
and eventually violent attacks (for instance in response to expected reinforcements of the group leaders).
 Neutralization of ostentatious identity signs.
 Moving to social exclusion and marginalization often related to delinquency and/or secrecy. These individuals could
become contact persons supporting logistics in case of necessity (weapons, hideouts, documents, money… ).
 Relatively important latency. A noticeable age gap of several years between teenagers who get involved in
radicalisation process and older individuals taking part in terrorist activities.
 During the years of conflict voluntary departures to Syria and Iraq were taking place at this stage even if beginning
from the fascination stage spontaneous departures can be observed following the logic of attachment to the individuals
who are already involved to a greater extent.
Terrorist involvement  Multiple forms of involvement and modes of actions: terrorism, armed actions in war zones.
 Socio-cognitive evasion of inhibitory mechanisms set up by stays abroad.
 Individuals’ difficulties to go back since it would imply to call into question all the cognitions elaborated during the
radicalisation process in the context of extreme existential crisis (cognitive discordance) as at this stage we observe an
undifferentiation between personal and collective objectives.
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becomes possible owing to numerous cognitive
mechanisms of neutralisation and moral disengage-
ment (which are present from this first phase) trivia-
lises the use of violence, which becomes a necessary
and legitimate method to affirm one’s social identity
in a public space (and is considered a lawful method,
as it is a consequence of the perceived injustice
inflicted). The proximity to radicalisation induced by
this restructuring of representations facilitates and
strengthens subsequent active information seeking or,
in the absence of network links, promotes activism
or eventual action.
In most recent terrorist attacks, the perpetrators’
personal psychological problems, a source of frustra-
tion that is not necessarily pathological, supplemented
the radical affirmation of legitimate violence that is
characteristic of the victim attitude and through the
mechanism of narcissistic self-reinforcement rapidly
created the intention to commit an attack. In these
cases, the radical statement of the action, which was
more than ideological, can be seen as a pretext and a
meaningful justification of an egocentric and deadly
action that reflected personal identity problems.
Despite the prospects it opens up, this study has
several limitations. The first limitation, which is spe-
cific to this field of research, concerns the definition
of the concept of radicalisation. It is very difficult to
define the nature and the boundaries of this process.
For this study, we chose to conceptualise the radica-
lisation process as part of a continuum. However,
this approach is contestable, specifically in relation
to Islamic radicalisation for ideological and political
reasons. The second limitation concerns the data
source. We used data from legal expert interviews.
This approach raises questions about the compliance
and sincerity of the subjects, given the legal
issues that surrounded them. Finally, we adopted an
inductive clinical and qualitative approach based
on individual interviews that is regularly used in
criminology. Although this approach provides rich
information, and permitted investigation of the socio-
cognitive mechanisms underlying the radicalisation
process, it ideally requires quantitative confirmation
to ensure the validity of the model identified.
Conclusion
Although psychological models of radicalisation
have been previously discredited, current approaches
within the sociocognitive paradigm of personality
offer a conceptual framework that can increase
understanding of how a person’s cognitive (as well
as environmental) information analysis can affect
the radicalisation process.
This qualitative and inductive research referred to
central studies in the field of radicalisation and
sought to elucidate the cognitive aspect of radicalisa-
tion. The descriptive characteristics of the subjects
were entirely in accord with previous findings.
Using a qualitative approach, we were able to
develop a model that allows the investigation of the
sociocognitive mechanisms involved in the inter-
pretive systems of radicalised people. This model of
cognitive and affective transformation of self-defini-
tion and sense construction in violent radical
engagement considers the process of radicalisation
from the individual’s point of view through succes-
sive modifications induced by a gradual cognitive
restructuring in a context of dynamic interactions
and mutual determinism with the environment.
This model also allows the integration of the
Figure 1. Model of cognitive and affective self-definition and meaning construction in violent radical engagement.
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transformation of subjective representations related
to feelings of injustice and discrimination. These
feelings are mobilised by the person’s interpretative
system when they assess their own situation and
form the basis for motivation toward radicalism.
This level of analysis seems essential to us, as it
allows us to understand how different levels of
macro- and meso-analysis, whatever their content,
are mobilised and integrated into the person’s
thought system. We are aware of the study limita-
tions: the data were based on expert assessments of
individuals involved in the process of radicalisation
and who were often involved in the judicial and/or
penal systems; the use of such data raises several
concerns, including that of compliance. However,
access to this population of radicalised people
remains very difficult, and few studies use such
interviews, even if these are within a framework of
forensic expertise. However, we believe that these
data are valuable as, to our knowledge, this is the
only study on the sociocognitive processes underly-
ing radicalisation. We aim to conduct further, quan-
titative, studies to test this model to ensure that it
has empirical validity and a strong conceptual basis.
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